GE Author
Published: November 8, 2026
Read: 8 min
In: GUJARAT

Investigation | BharatNet Phase-3 in Gujarat: Administrative Failure or Institutional Inertia?

9 Companies Bid. The Tender Was Cancelled. Where Did 12–15 Months Go?

By Abhishek Pandey | Gandhinagar

Nine Bidders, One Cancelled Tender and a Year Lost

Public procurement demands more than the allocation of funds and the issuance of tenders. It requires sound planning, transparent decision-making and accountability at every stage. These obligations assume particular importance when a project involves thousands of crores in public money and the digital infrastructure of rural communities.

The procurement process for BharatNet Phase-3 in Gujarat raises serious questions about how these principles were applied.

Under a quadripartite agreement signed in June 2025 between Digital Bharat Nidhi (DBN), the Gujarat government, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) and Gujarat Fibre Grid Network Limited (GFGNL), the state set out to connect all 14,737 gram panchayats through a modern IP-MPLS ring network. The project carries central financial assistance of approximately ₹5,631 crore.

GFGNL, the state agency responsible for implementation, initiated the first tendering process in 2025. Nine companies participated, bringing established players from the telecommunications and infrastructure sectors into the bidding process.

The tender was subsequently cancelled. In 2026, GFGNL issued a revised Request for Proposal (RFP), restarting the procurement exercise.

The decision raises fundamental questions about the planning and administration of the project. Why was the original tender cancelled after nine companies had submitted bids? What technical or administrative grounds supported the decision? Who authorised it? What happened to the bidders’ Earnest Money Deposits (EMDs)? And why did the procurement process lose an estimated 12–15 months?

This episode of Gujarat Exclusive’s investigation examines the original tender, the companies that participated and the circumstances surrounding its cancellation.

1. The First Tender: Two Packages, Separate Operational Responsibilities

GFGNL initiated the first procurement exercise for BharatNet Phase-3 in Gujarat in the early months of 2025.

Original tender reference: GFGNL/GFG/e-file/263/2025/0006

The original procurement framework divided the project into separate work packages and operational components. Its principal features included:

  • Two principal packages: Network construction and implementation were broadly divided into two geographical and zonal packages, designated Package A and Package B.
  • Separate operational infrastructure: Independent tenders were invited for the establishment and upgradation of the State Network Operations Centre (NOC) and telecom shelters. These included tender references 2025/0016/NOC and 2025/0041.
  • Distinct implementation responsibilities: Network construction and deployment were assigned a separate scope through the Project Implementation Agency (PIA), while network operations and associated infrastructure were structured as distinct areas of responsibility.

GFGNL’s initial approach was based on multiple packages, with separate arrangements for network deployment and operational infrastructure.

The subsequent cancellation puts this original framework under scrutiny. Did the package-based approach encounter technical or project-management difficulties? Did the separate arrangements for the NOC and telecom shelters require changes? What assessment led GFGNL to abandon the procurement exercise?

The technical evaluations, administrative decisions and official records surrounding the cancellation are central to establishing what went wrong.

2. Nine Companies Entered the Race. Why Was the Tender Scrapped?

Nine companies submitted bids for the original 2025 BharatNet Phase-3 tender. According to the available tender records, the bidders included:

Their participation brought established companies from the telecommunications, network infrastructure and engineering sectors into the competition.

The subsequent cancellation demands scrutiny. What did the technical evaluation reveal? Were deficiencies identified in the original tender conditions? Had the project’s technical architecture or implementation strategy changed? Who concluded that the existing procurement process could not continue?

A tender involving nine participating companies and a project worth thousands of crores was brought to an end and had to be restarted. The reasons for that decision, the authority behind it and the records supporting it are central to the investigation.

3. The Cancellation: Where Are the Reasons?

The cancellation of the original 2025 tender is one of the most consequential decisions in the procurement history of BharatNet Phase-3 in Gujarat.

The tender documents and sequence of corrigenda examined so far do not set out the detailed technical or administrative grounds for the cancellation. The official decision-making record is therefore critical.

What specific deficiency was identified in the original tender? Who recommended any change to the implementation framework? Which technical assessment supported the decision? Which authority approved it? Was a formal cancellation order issued, and what reasons did it record?

These questions go to the heart of how a ₹5,631-crore public infrastructure project was planned and administered.

The financial position of the participating companies also warrants examination. Preparing a bid for a major infrastructure project involves substantial technical, financial and managerial resources. Companies must assess project specifications, prepare technical proposals, compile supporting documents and arrange financial commitments, including the EMD.

When were the deposits refunded following the cancellation? Were any withheld for an extended period? Did any participating company formally object to the cancellation or raise concerns about the refund process?

GFGNL’s records should establish when the deposits were released and whether participating companies faced financial or procedural difficulties.

4. The Cost of Cancellation: Where Did 12–15 Months Go?

After the original 2025 tender was cancelled, GFGNL issued a revised RFP in 2026, setting the procurement process in motion again.

Revised tender reference: GFGNL/GFG/e-file/263/2026/0070

The transition to a fresh procurement exercise raises questions about the time lost and its consequences for the project.

The project timeline

A fresh tender requires another round of technical reviews, revised contractual conditions, pre-bid consultations, responses to prospective bidders and a new submission schedule. The interval between the original 2025 tender and the revised RFP issued in 2026 points to a potential delay of approximately 12–15 months.

What accounted for this interval? Was the time spent addressing technical deficiencies, revising the project framework or securing administrative approvals? At what level were the decisions taken?

For a project intended to connect every gram panchayat in Gujarat, the loss of more than a year carries significant public consequences.

The impact on participating companies

The nine bidders committed technical, financial and managerial resources to the original procurement exercise. A prolonged process followed by cancellation can disrupt commercial planning and leave resources tied up in uncertainty.

Any delay in refunding EMDs would add to that burden. The timing of the refunds and any delay in recovering the deposits are therefore relevant to assessing the consequences for participating companies.

The possibility of cost escalation

Prices of optical fibre cables, network equipment, electronic hardware and other technology components can change over time. A prolonged procurement cycle can widen the gap between estimates prepared for the original tender and the financial bids received under a revised exercise.

Did the cancellation and subsequent delay affect the project’s estimated cost? A comparison of the original and revised financial estimates, technical specifications and price schedules would establish whether restarting the procurement process carried a financial consequence.

The cost to rural communities

BharatNet is intended to provide more than basic telecommunications infrastructure. Its broader purpose is to connect rural communities with digital public services, educational resources, healthcare facilities and economic opportunities.

Every delay in implementation postpones the intended benefits for gram panchayats, schools, healthcare centres, rural entrepreneurs and citizens who depend on reliable broadband connectivity.

The consequences of the cancellation therefore extend beyond tender administration. They concern the project timeline, potential cost escalation, market participation and the delivery of essential digital infrastructure across rural Gujarat.

5. Who Took the Decision, and Who Is Accountable?

The cancellation of the first BharatNet Phase-3 tender demands scrutiny of the administrative chain of decision-making.

Was the original RFP subjected to a comprehensive technical assessment before its issuance? If the framework later proved inadequate, who was responsible for identifying the deficiencies? Why did these concerns emerge after nine companies had submitted bids?

The approval process is equally important. Which competent authority authorised the cancellation? Was the decision based on recommendations from a technical committee, or was it taken at the administrative level? Were the views of the departments and agencies concerned formally recorded?

The answers lie in the original project file, internal notings, technical committee recommendations, approval of the competent authority and the formal cancellation order.

The available records establish that the first tender, initiated in 2025, did not proceed to completion and that GFGNL restarted procurement through a revised RFP in 2026. The complete technical and administrative rationale behind this transition remains central to the investigation.

A project backed by approximately ₹5,631 crore in central financial assistance demands a clear record of decisions and responsibility. A delay extending beyond a year raises questions about the adequacy of the original planning, the decisions that followed and the officials responsible.

The central issue is whether the original procurement was adequately planned, why nine bids did not translate into implementation and who is accountable for the time lost.

Three Questions That Demand Answers

  1. Who authorised the cancellation? Which competent authority discontinued the original 2025 tender, and what technical and administrative reasons were formally recorded?
  2. What happened to the bidders’ EMDs? When were the deposits refunded? Were any companies’ funds withheld for an extended period, and did any bidder formally raise objections?
  3. Who is accountable for the time lost? Who bears responsibility for the interval between cancellation of the original tender and issuance of the revised RFP? Did the delay affect the project’s estimated cost or its proposed 2027 completion deadline?

In the Next Episode

The next episode will examine the financial eligibility conditions in GFGNL’s revised tender, particularly the ₹4,700-crore turnover requirement. The investigation will examine how these conditions shaped the field of eligible bidders and raised questions about competition and access to a major public infrastructure contract.

The investigation continues...

Project Reference: Amended BharatNet Programme (ABP), Phase-3, Gujarat.
Original Tender Reference: GFGNL/GFG/e-file/263/2025/0006.
Revised Tender Reference: GFGNL/GFG/e-file/263/2026/0070.

You may be interested

Join the Discourse

ગુજરાતીમાં વાંચો
SKINS 12 EDITIONS
ACCENT COLOR
TYPOGRAPHY SYSTEM